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Abstract Relative adjectives in the positive form exhibit vagueness and context-
sensitivity. We suggest that these phenomena can be explained by the interaction of a
free threshold variable in the meaning of the positive form with a probabilistic model
of pragmatic inference. We describe a formal model of utterance interpretation as
coordination, which jointly infers the value of the threshold variable and the intended
meaning of the sentence. We report simulations exploring the effect of background
statistical knowledge on adjective interpretation in this model. Motivated by these
simulation results, we suggest that this approach can account for the correlation
between scale structure and the relative/absolute distinction while also allowing for
exceptions noted in previous work. Finally, we argue for a probabilistic explanation
of why the sorites paradox is compelling with relative adjectives even though the
second premise is false on a universal interpretation, and show that this account
predicts Kennedy’s (2007) observation that the sorites paradox is more compelling
with relative than with absolute adjectives.
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1 Adjective interpretation
The meanings of relative adjectives in the positive form are highly context-dependent:
a cheap house is likely to be more expensive than an expensive book, and what counts
as ‘cheap’ for a house is sensitive to the distribution of costs in a reference class (see
Kamp 1975; Klein 1980; Kennedy 2007; Bale 2011; Solt 2011 and many others).
Relative adjectives are also vague, as evidenced by the existence of borderline cases
(illustrated in (1)) and susceptibility to the sorites paradox (as in (2)): see Sapir
1944; Fine 1975; Williamson 1994; Kennedy 2007 and many others.
(1) [Almost all houses in this neighborhood cost $300,000-$600,000.]
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a. The Williams’ $1,000,000 house is expensive.
b. The Clarks’ $75,000 house is not expensive.
c. The Jacobsons’ $475,000 house is neither expensive nor not expensive — it
is roughly average.
(2) a. A house that costs $10,000,000 is expensive (for this neighborhood).
b. A house that costs $1 less than a house that is expensive (for this neighbor-
hood) is also expensive (for this neighborhood).
c. ∴ A house that costs $1 is expensive (for this neighborhood).
Our first goal in this paper is to present an account which explains these properties
using two theoretical components. The first is a familiar style of degree semantics
in which the meaning of the positive form contains a free variable whose value is
determined in some fashion by context. The second component is a pragmatic theory
built around the assumption that speakers and listeners are Bayesian agents who
work to coordinate the speaker’s intended message with the listener’s interpretation.
As we will show, this theory explains in precise terms how listeners infer the value
of the context-dependent variable in the meaning of positive-form adjectives, and
why it should be context-dependent and vague in precisely this way. The theory
provides an explanation of why statistical properties of reference classes should
play an important role in determining the interpretation of positive-form adjectives,
but does so without importing statistical information into the semantic theory proper.
This proposal advances the state of the art in several ways. Previous free-
variable theories of the positive form constrain the value of the variable in certain
ways, but say little about how the value of the variable is resolved so that a vague
utterance can be interpreted as conveying significant information (e.g., Fara 2000;
Kennedy 2007—but see Barker 2002 for a partial exception). Previous probabilistic
theories, similarly, simply assume that context provides a probability distribution
without saying how the distribution is derived or why it should be sensitive to
statistical information (Edgington 1995; Schmidt, Goodman, Barner & Tenenbaum
2009; Frazee & Beaver 2010; Lassiter 2011b). In contrast, we derive the observed
interpretation from simple, plausible assumptions about how agents interact and the
form of their background knowledge. In addition, our proposal is (to our knowledge)
the first to make precise quantitative predictions about the information conveyed by
vague adjectives, how interpreters will behave in sorites-like situations, and how this
behavior depends on background knowledge.
The second goal of the paper is to show that this theory is capable of explaining
the relative/absolute adjective distinction noted by Unger (1971) which has been the
subject of much attention in the recent literature on adjectives (Rotstein & Winter
2004; Kennedy & McNally 2005; Kennedy 2007; Burnett 2014, etc.). As Kennedy
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(2007) points out, absolute adjectives like safe and dangerous differ from relative
adjectives like expensive and cheap in all of the key properties mentioned above:
they are less (perhaps not) vague, have a smaller (perhaps no) borderline region, and
have less (perhaps no) context-dependence in their interpretations. Our approach
predicts these qualitative differences between relative and absolute adjectives as a
function of the precise form of the interpreter’s background knowledge, which is
itself constrained by the boundedness of the scale that an adjective lies on. We
argue that this approach provides an explanation of the correlation between scale
structure and the absolute/relative distinction that Kennedy notes, and improves on
this analysis by relying only on independently motivated theoretical mechanisms
and making room for exceptions noted in previous literature (Kennedy & McNally
2005; Lassiter 2010; McNally 2011).
2 Semantic assumptions
We adopt a degree semantics in which adjectives relate individuals to a threshold
value, schematically:
(3) JAK = λθAλx[µA(x) > θA]
θA is a degree on A’s scale—the threshold—and µA(x) is the measure of x on this
scale. For example, if A is tall, then the scale is the range of possible heights (0,∞),
and µA is a function mapping objects to values in this range.1 We assume that the
lexical entry of a gradable adjective contains only two components: a specification
of the relevant scale — an ordered set of degrees — an an indication of the adjective’s
polarity along that scale. That is, antonym pairs such as tall/short and dangerous/safe
live on scales which are identical except that the ordering is reversed.
The threshold argument is needed in order to account for uses in which the
threshold is semantically rather than pragmatically controlled, e.g., two feet tall or
taller than Mary. However, the result of its presence in (3) is that we cannot directly
compose tall and Al in order to form a sentence such as Al is tall. A fairly standard
solution to this problem is to posit a silent morpheme POS which binds the value of
θtall to a contextual parameter stall (e.g., von Stechow 1984; Kennedy 2007). For
this approach we need to assume that each adjective A is supplied with a dedicated
contextual parameter sA.
(4) a. JtallKstall,sbig,sheavy,... = λθtallλx[µtall(x) > θtall]
b. JPOSKstall,sbig,sheavy,... = λAλx[A(sA)(x)]
1 This is a ⟨d,et⟩ semantics for adjectives in the style of von Stechow (1984). For current purposes,
it does not matter whether we use this analysis or an ⟨e,d⟩ treatment as in Bartsch & Vennemann
1973; Kennedy 1997, 2007. The only modification needed would be in the definition of the POS
morpheme/type-shifter.
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c. JPOS tallKstall,sbig,sheavy,... = λx[µtall(x) > stall]
d. JAl is POS tallKstall,sbig,sheavy,... = µtall(Al) > stall
The result is that Al is tall is true iff Al’s height is greater than stall, whatever that is.
An alternative account is to treat POS as a type-shifter which reverses the order
of the arguments, as in (5). (Additional type-shifters would be needed to pass
up the unsaturated variable in non-predicative uses and non-matrix contexts; the
intended account is a generalization of the treatment of free anaphors in variable-free
semantics (Jacobson 1999).)
(5) a. JtallK = λθtallλx[µtall(x) > θtall]
b. JPOSK = λAλxλθA[A(θA)(x)]
c. JPOS tallK = λxλθtall[µtall(x) > θtall]
d. JAl is POS tallK = λθtall[µtall(Al) > θtall]
These accounts are really not very different: both provide, in compositional fashion,
a sentence meaning which does not determine a truth-value until the value of a
certain free/unsaturated variable is determined. In either case, pragmatic inference is
required to determine which proposition the sentence expresses.2
3 Inferring context-sensitive meanings: relative adjectives
Our pragmatic theory builds on accounts which emphasize the importance of coordi-
nation, in particular developments of Grice 1957, 1989 on game-theoretic principles
(Lewis 1969; Clark 1996; Benz, Jäger & van Rooij 2005; Jäger 2007; Franke 2009).
We follow closely recent work in Bayesian pragmatics (Frank & Goodman 2012;
Bergen, Goodman & Levy 2012; Goodman & Stuhlmüller 2012; Smith, Goodman &
Frank 2013; Goodman & Lassiter 2014), which combine Gricean and game-theoretic
influences with an approach to inference and decision-making under uncertainty
which has been very influential in recent cognitive science (Pearl 2000; Griffiths,
Kemp & Tenenbaum 2008; Tenenbaum, Kemp, Griffiths & Goodman 2011). Related
ideas can be found in Golland, Liang & Klein 2010; Lassiter 2012; Kehler & Rohde
2013; Vogel, Bodoia, Potts & Jurafsky 2013a; Vogel, Potts & Jurafsky 2013b. Our
account of adjective interpretation and the relative-absolute distinction is inspired in
part by Potts (2008); Franke (2012a,b), though the model and interpretation differ in
significant respects.
2 Note that we assume degrees in the semantic ontology. However, the semantic feature that drives
pragmatic inference in our theory is the availability of multiple interpretations, ordered (for example)
by logical entailment. This is common to all accounts, and so it should be possible to extend the
account to degree-free theories as well.
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3.1 Bayesian inference in brief
Bayesian models rely on two crucial formal assumptions. First, subjective uncer-
tainty is represented as a probability distribution P(⋅) over propositions (sets of
worlds). This is essentially an enrichment of the familiar sets-of-worlds picture of
information states. The addition of a measure over propositions allows us to make
fine-grained epistemic statements, not only about what is possible, impossible, or
necessary, but also about what is more or less likely. P(⋅) is constrained as follows:
(6) a. For all A ⊆W , P(A) ∈ [0,1].
b. P(W) = 1.
c. For any disjoint A,B ⊆W , P(A∪B) = P(A)+P(B).
Second, Bayesian models assume that, upon learning some proposition A, agents
update their information state by conditioning on A, yielding a new probability
distribution which continues to obey the constraints in (6).
(7) P(B∣A) = P(B∧A)
P(A)
In many cases, it is more straightforward to calculate P(B∣A) using Bayes’ rule (but
note that this rule is a straightforward consequence of the definition of conditional
probability in (7)). If B = {B1,B2, ...} is a partition of W , then we have:
(8) P(Bi∣A) = P(A∣Bi)×P(Bi)∑∣B∣j=1P(A∣B j)×P(B j)
Suppose that the elements of B are hypotheses about the process by which observa-
tion A was generated. We can then think of the core Bayesian assumption as follows:
the probability that hidden cause Bi is true, given that we have made observation A,
is proportional to the product of two terms: (i) the probability that we would have
observed A if hidden cause Bi were true, and (ii) the probability that we assigned to
hidden cause Bi before we observed A.
(9) P(Bi∣A)∝ P(A∣Bi)×P(Bi)
For convenience, we will sometimes write instances of Bayes’ rule in this form,
without specifying the full space of alternative hypotheses B j which we would have
to consider in order to calculate P(Bi∣A). The missing denominator is a constant
which will be the same regardless of the choice of Bi; it is required to ensure that the
resulting distribution sums to 1.
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3.2 Pragmatic model
We assume that speakers and listeners maintain probabilistic models of each others’
utterance planning and interpretation processes, and that these models drive prag-
matic language use. In particular, listeners use their models of speakers’ utterance
choice to resolve context-sensitivity on Bayesian principles: they jointly infer the
state of the world and the values of semantic variables, and then marginalize out the
variables to find a posterior on the state of the world.
The most straightforward way to implement recursive reasoning of this type
would be along the following lines: a listener L updates her information state, given
that some utterance has been made, by reasoning about how the speaker would have
chosen utterances or other actions in various possible worlds, and weighting the
result by the probability that those worlds are indeed actual. Conversely, a speaker
chooses utterances by reasoning about how the listener will interpret the utterance,
together with some private utterance preferences P(u) (representing, for example, a
preference for brevity, frequency effects, or ease of retrieval).
In this paper we focus on the interpretation process of a listener who reasons to
some finite depth. In particular, our pragmatic listener L1 reasons about a speaker
S1, who reasons about a literal listener L0. The literal listener does not reason
pragmatically, and so serves as the base case, preventing infinite recursion. The
model is easily extended to speakers and listeners who reason to greater depths, but,
as we will see, robust pragmatic effects can arise already at level 1.
3.2.1 Literal listener L0
L0 is defined as an agent who responds to u by simply conditioning on its truth. This
is essentially a probabilistic version of the fictional naïve interpreter of Stalnaker
(1978), who responds to utterances by simply assuming that they are true.3
(10) PL0(A∣u) = PL0(A∣JuK = 1)
Since conditioning is defined only for propositions, this model is only appropriate
if u determines a proposition (contains no free variables). If u’s meaning does make
reference to some set of free variables V , the listener must find some way to infer
values for these variables. In our model, the listener simply passes free variables
up through the speaker model to be estimated by the pragmatic listener. (The
technique of passing variables between speaker and listener to evaluate candidate
interpretations introduced here is a development of the “lexical uncertainty” model
3 There is even a close relationship between the update operations: Stalnakerian update is set intersec-
tion, and conditionalization is intersection followed by renormalization of the measure.
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of Bergen et al. (2012).)
(11) PL0(A∣u,V) = PL0(A∣JuKV = 1)
For example, if u is Al is tall then V will include a value for θtall . If θtall were
known to be 6′, equation (11) tells us that L0’s posterior probability for any A would
be PL0(A ∣ µtall(Al) > 6′) — the distribution derived from PL0(⋅) by assigning 0
probability to worlds in which Al is 6′ or shorter, and then renormalizing.
Since θtall is not known, L0 conditionalizes on its value and passes the variable
up to the pragmatic listener L1 via the speaker S1. The effect of passing through the
speaker model is that the inferred values of free variables are sensitive to features of
the speaker model. In our case, the crucial feature is the speaker’s preference for
informative utterances.4
3.2.2 Speaker S1
The speaker model encodes a pressure to make statements which are informative
relative to the current topic of conversation/Question Under Discussion (QUD:
Ginzburg 1995a,b; Roberts 1996). Both are important, since we do not wish to
predict that speakers will say things that are highly informative in a global sense if
they are irrelevant to the current conversation. In our model, the QUD provides a
set of possible answers A over which the informativity of a potential utterance is
calculated.
Suppose that the QUD is How tall is Al?, and assume that S1 knows the true
answer A — Al’s precise height. (Note that we do not assume omniscient speakers
in the real world; S1, like L0, is a component of the listener’s pragmatic reasoning
process.) The speaker and listener share the goal of coordinating utterance and
interpretation so as to maximize the probability that the listener will choose the
correct answer to the QUD. We thus define the utility of u for speaker S1 to be
proportional to its informativity to the literal listener L0 about the true answer A,
4 An alternative to passing variables up to level 1 is to integrate them out at level 0:
PL0(A∣u) =∑
V
PL0(A,V ∣JuKV = 1)
We discuss the choice between this model and the one in the main text in detail in Goodman &
Lassiter 2014. Inference at level 0 may be appropriate for certain natural language phenomena, such
as lexical ambiguity resolution. However, when applied to scalar adjective interpretation this model
predicts extremely weak interpretations when the range of plausible values for a variable is small
relative to the range of logically possible values. In contrast, the model described here is not sensitive
to the range over which the meaning is estimated, as long as nearly all of the prior mass falls within
this range. For this reason, we focus on the model with variables lifted to the pragmatic listener in
this paper.
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minus a non-negative cost C(u). Informativity is quantified as negative surprisal
(positive log probability) of the true answer in the posterior, assuming that the
utterance is true under the relevant parametrization (Shannon 1948; Xu & Tenenbaum
2007; Frank & Goodman 2012).
(12) US1(u;A,V) = log(PL0(A∣u,V))−C(u)
Most work in game theory assumes that agents deterministically choose the
action with the highest utility. We assume a slightly less demanding model according
to which agents sample actions, with the probability of making a choice increasing
with its utility. Soft-max choice rules of this type are widely employed in psychology
and machine learning (Luce 1959; Sutton & Barto 1998).
(13) PS1(u∣A,V)∝ exp(α ×US1(u;A,V))
This choice rule has a parameter α > 0 which determines how closely stochastic
choice approximates deterministic utility-maximization. With α =∞, we would
recover the choice rule typically used in game theory. In simulations reported below
we set α to a lowish value of 4. The qualitative results reported are not extremely
sensitive to the value of this parameter, though very high and very low settings would
yield (respectively) over-/under-informative interpretations for vague expressions.
We must assume a space of alternative utterances u′ in order to find the normal-
izing constant for (13). This choice has important effects on the behavior of the
model, and it is not currently well-investigated from an empirical or computational
perspective. For present purposes we will assume (essentially following Katzir
(2007); Fox & Katzir (2011)) that the alternative utterances considered are a subset
of the possible answers to the QUD. We will also assume that speakers have the
option of saying nothing. In particular, a sentence with a scalar adjective such as Al
is tall is interpreted by consulting the alternatives Al is short and ∅; the qualitative
results reported below do not differ in major respects if we also consider Al is very
tall/short and Al is medium height. Nevertheless, a major desideratum in future work
will be to get a clearer picture of how speakers and listeners choose a realistic but
manageable set of alternatives for pragmatic reasoning.
3.2.3 Pragmatic listener L1
The pragmatic listener L1 interprets utterances using Bayesian inference, taking into
account what S1 would be likely to say given A as well as its prior probability. L1
jointly estimates the value of A and the free variables, taking into account the prior
probability of each.
(14)
PL1(A,V ∣u) ∝ PS1(u∣A,V)×PL1(A,V)∝ PS1(u∣A,V)×PL1(A)×PL1(V)
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The second line follows because A and V are a priori independent: answers to the
QUD and semantic variables are related only via the interpretation process.
PL1(A) specifies L1’s background knowledge about answers to the QUD. For
example, if the QUD is How tall is Al? and L1 knows only that Al is an adult man,
then PL1(A) is an estimate of the distribution of heights among adult men.
PL1(V) specifies L1’s background knowledge about the interpretation of semantic
variables. We will make the assumption that the listener has no relevant background
knowledge about the resolution of linguistic variables, and so no reason to favor any
choice of V . PL0/1(V) is thus uniform for all possible combinations of values for the
elements of V .5 On this assumption, (14) simplifies to (15):
(15) PL1(A,V ∣u)∝ PS1(u∣A,V)×PL1(A)
The assumption of uniform priors on semantic variables means that, if u = Al is
tall, all possible thresholds for tall are equally good candidates a priori; we do not,
for example, build in a preference for interpretations which are statistically more
frequent in uses of tall. There may in fact be reason to adopt such a preference for
certain pragmatic phenomena, e.g., discourse anaphora (see Kehler & Rohde 2012).
However, a similar assumption would likely cause problems for scalar adjectives
given the extreme context-sensitivity of their interpretation: for instance, if the prior
P(θtall) favored human-like heights, we would end up with excessively low estimates
of the meanings of tall tree and tall building relative to the true statistics of heights
in these classes. In addition, the assumption of a uniform prior on interpretations
is useful since it allows us to demonstrate that the patterns illustrated in §3.3 are
generated by features of our pragmatic model, rather than a stipulated prior on
interpretations.
Finally, note that we treat overt comparison classes (e.g., tall for an adult man
vs. tall for an 8-year-old) as specifying a prior on A to be used for the purpose of
interpreting the scalar adjective tall. This is a natural assumption given our model,
but we leave open the compositional process by which this effect is achieved.
3.3 Model predictions
In all simulations reported here we rescale variables to fall within [0,1], and assume
that P(θA) is uniform over [0,1] for any adjective A. Simulations use Markov Chain
Monte Carlo techniques (Neal 1993; MacKay 2003) to draw 5,000,000 samples from
PL1(A,θ∣ u). We set the cost term to cost(u) = 2/3× length(u), with length measured
in number of words: for example, cost(Sam is tall) = 2. For height adjectives, we
5 Note that PL0/1(V) is an improper prior if the range of V extends to infinity in either direction.
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assume a prior which is quasi-normal within this range, since the heights of adult
men are roughly normally distributed.6
Suppose again that the QUD is How tall is Al?, and let u = Al is tall. The
pragmatic listener considers, for each value of θtall , how likely it is that the speaker
would use utterance u if that were the true value of the semantic variable. For
reference, the level-1 model is summarized in (16):
(16)
PL1(A,θtall ∣u) ∝ PS1(u∣A,θtall)×PL1(A)
PS1(u∣A,θtall) ∝ exp(α × [log(PL0(A∣u,θtall))−C(u)])
PL0(A∣u,θtall) = PL0(A∣JuKθtall = 1)
The posterior on interpretations that this model derives reflects a balancing
process between the speaker’s informativity preference and the listener’s beliefs
about which utterances would be true. Very weak interpretations, with θtall falling
in the lower region of the height prior, are probably true; however, the informativity
preference entails that speaker would probably not have chosen to use the utterance
in such a situation. Conversely, very strong interpretations (with θtall in the extreme
upper tail of the height prior) are dispreferred because they make the utterance very
likely to be false — even though they would be extremely informative if true. The
effect is a preference for interpretations which make Al fairly tall, but not implausibly
so.
We simulated the joint posterior of A and θtall as above, assuming this time
that θtall is a level-1 context-sensitive variable. The marginal distributions of both
variables are plotted in figure 1.
There are several things to note about these simulation results. Most importantly,
the interpretation derived in this way depends crucially on the statistics of heights:
the inferred meaning of tall, for instance, is a distribution centered around 1.3
standard deviations above the prior mean. Since the scale in these simulations is
arbitrary, the model predicts that a normal prior with a different mean and standard
deviation would lead to a qualitatively similar but quantitatively different posterior,
differing in mean and variance. This feature allows us to explain how tall can have
a stable core meaning in tall boy, tall tree, and tall building, while also explaining
why they are interpreted differently. Assuming that heights are normally distributed
in each class but differ in mean and standard deviation, the posterior on θtall and A
6 Simulations use a burn-in of 5000 samples. As discussed above, we set α = 4 and assume alternative
actions {say “Apos”, say “Aneg”, say nothing}, where Apos and Aneg are an antonym pair. The plots
show the kernel density of L1 samples.
The motivation for rescaling to [0,1] is that a uniform prior is not well-defined over the range(0,∞). By “quasi-normal”, we mean that P(A) = 0 for A < 0 and A > 1, and P(A)∝N (.5, .15)
otherwise. We cannot define a true normal distribution on [0,1] since this distribution has support
over the entire real line.
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Figure 1 Interpretation when tall is treated as a level-1 context-sensitive expres-
sion. The model predicts several core properties of relative adjectives:
vagueness, borderline cases, and sensitivity to statistical priors.
will be shifted accordingly, while maintaining the same shape relative to the prior
mean and standard deviation. Background knowledge, in the form of a statistical
prior on answers to the QUD, thus interacts with lexical meaning and the pragmatic
preference for informativity to yield a context-sensitive probabilistic meaning.
Second, the inferred meaning of “tall” is essentially “significantly greater than
average height”, an intuition which has been expressed in the literature in various
forms (e.g., Fara 2000; Kennedy 2007). Crucially, though, the resulting interpre-
tation remains vague: the interpreter maintains uncertainty about the contextual
interpretation of tall, but this uncertainty does not prevent her from inferring that
it does have a meaning, or from learning something about Al’s height from the
utterance. Finally, the existence of borderline cases is predicted straightforwardly:
if Al’s height falls around the posterior mean of θtall (height ≈ .7), he has equal
probability of counting as “tall” and “not tall” in the current context, and we are thus
maximally uncertain about the appropriateness of each label.
The model of pragmatic interpretation sketched here, with threshold values and
other semantic variables passed up to the pragmatic listener, interacts with our simple
free-variable semantics to predict several of the key properties of relative adjectives
in the positive form. In the next section we will consider the model’s predictions
about interpretation with different types of priors. After that we return to a discussion
of vagueness and the sorites paradox.
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4 Absolute adjectives
Absolute adjectives such as wet/dry, dangerous/safe, and full/empty differ from
relative adjectives such as tall/short in a number of ways. As Rotstein & Winter
(2004); Kennedy & McNally (2005); Kennedy (2007) and others have discussed,
their meanings seem to admit of less uncertainty than those of relative adjectives,
have little or no borderline region, and appear to be less susceptible to the sorites
paradox (see Kennedy 2007 for detailed discussion). In this section we show that
our model is able to account for these phenomena as well, given certain assumptions
about the form of priors appropriate to different properties.
A puzzle which has caught the attention of many semanticists in recent years
is the correlation between the relative/absolute distinction and a certain topological
property of scales: the presence or absence of inherent endpoints. Kennedy (2007)
points out that absolute adjectives can occur only on scales with endpoints, and that
there is a strong correlation between lack of endpoints and relative interpretation. He
observes that theories of the positive form developed with only relative adjectives
like tall in mind fail to predict the second observation: since there is no barrier to
defining a context-dependent threshold on a bounded scale, relative meanings should
be generally available. A major desideratum for a theory of adjectives, then, is to
explain the correlation between boundedness and absolute interpretations.
Kennedy (2007) claims that the meaning of a positive-form adjective associated
with a bounded scale is always anchored to one of the endpoints. The proposed
theoretical explanation invokes a principle of Interpretive Economy (IE): “Maximize
the contribution of the conventional meanings of the elements of a sentence to the
computation of its truth conditions”. Kennedy uses this principle to account for
the correlation between boundedness and absolute interpretation, and argues in
addition that absolute adjectives do not admit of vagueness, context-sensitivity, or
borderline cases at all. Lingering uncertainty about the applicability of absolute
adjectives in some cases is accounted for by invoking a qualitatively different kind
of uncertainty — imprecision (Lasersohn 1999).
This analysis is insightful, but some conceptual and empirical problems remain.
First, the theoretical status of IE is unclear: as Potts (2008: 5) puts it, it is “an
optimization principle left unsupported by a theory of optimization”. Second,
there are several counter-examples to the generalization that relative and/or vague
adjectives never fall on bounded scales. Kennedy (2007) himself (fn. 30) points out
that bald, “the philosophers’ favorite vague adjective”, lives on a bounded scale and
behaves like an absolute adjective with respect to degree modification even though
it is vague. Expensive and cheap also appear to be counter-examples, since they
are clearly relative adjectives, and their scale is intuitively lower-bounded by the
point of zero cost. Kennedy suggests accounting for this pair by stipulating lexically
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that their linguistic scale excludes the zero point, even though the conceptual cost
scale includes it. However, Lassiter (2010) argues that this move is ad hoc, and that
additional exceptions exist including heavy/lightweight, (un)likely, and (im)probable.
It is not clear whether lexical exclusion of counter-examples is a theoretically
acceptable tactic; however, it does seem clear that much of the attraction of the
IE-based theory is lost if problematic cases must be explained away by positing
counter-intuitive scale structures.
A further issue is the relative use of full noted by Kennedy & McNally (2005);
McNally (2011), such as the convention of referring to a wine glass as “full” when
its content is around the half-way mark. Presumably we should adopt only as a last
resort a theory on which that the linguistic scale associated with full is bounded
or unbounded, depending on whether the adjective describes a container whose
contents are derived from grapes or grain. It would be better to have a theory which
explained why the convention of filling wine glasses to a lower proportion of the
total volume than beer glasses should influence the interpretation of the positive
form of the adjective full.
Our approach, in contrast, is embedded in a general pragmatic theory and is able
to explain the correlation in question while also allowing for deviations under certain
conditions. We suggest that the relevant mathematical property is a measure-theoretic
one which generalizes the topological property of boundedness: prototypical relative
interpretations arise with priors with a relatively mild rate of change and little or no
mass on the endpoints, while prototypical absolute interpretations arise with priors in
which a significant portion of the prior mass falls close to an upper or lower bound.
The following figures illustrate. We suggest that the Beta(1,9) prior in figure
2, which is skewed toward the zero point, has appropriate qualitative features for
min/max adjective pairs such as dangerous/safe. The probability that something
counts as dangerous increases rapidly as its degree of danger deviates from the zero
point, and the probability that it counts as safe decreases similarly (though slightly
faster).
Figure 3, with a uniform prior, likewise captures key features of the interpre-
tation of max/max pairs such as full/empty: both indicate proximity to (though
not necessarily identity with) an endpoint. (Note that a uniform prior may not be
appropriate here: a prior with most of the mass at one or the other endpoint might be
more realistic. If so, the change would merely strengthen the model’s preference for
extreme interpretations of full and empty.)
In both cases, the range over which the adjective’s applicability is uncertain is
much smaller than it is in the case of tall. Our model derives the observation that
absolute adjectives are less vague than relative adjectives in the positive form, but
does so without appealing to distinct theoretical mechanisms. The distinction is not
in the relevant kind of uncertainty, but in the amount and distribution of uncertainty.
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Figure 2 Qualitatively different statistical priors give rise to different, sometimes
absolute-like interpretations. With a prior favoring low values, a non-
zero but still small degree is required for the positive adjective, and
a near-minimal degree for the negative adjective (generated from the
positive adjective by replacing “>” with “<” in its lexical entry).
This account of the relative/absolute distinction also suggests an explanation for
the intuition that the meanings of absolute adjectives are less uncertain than those of
relative adjectives. For both members of the adjective pairs in figures 2 and 3, the
simulated threshold posteriors have substantially lower variance than that of θtall .
This means that small changes in degree can lead to a rapid shift in the probability
that an adjective is applicable to an object.
In contrast to theories which posit a rigid connection between scale structure
and the relative/absolute distinction, our model predicts that adjectives on closed
scales may receive relative interpretations if the prior has an appropriate shape. We
illustrate with adjectives of cost. We suggest that the prior density of the lower bound
should be small but non-zero; this corresponds to the observation that some things
are free, but the cost of items in a reference class will usually be shifted substantially
away from the zero point and trail off slowly.7 Figure 4 shows simulation results for
a prior of this form. Although the scale is lower-bounded in our extended sense (prior
density greater than zero at the minimum), an object must have cost substantially
greater than zero in order to have significant probability of counting as ‘expensive’.
This account of the difference between dangerous and expensive also suggests a
principled explanation of why full is interpreted differently for (e.g.) beer and wine
7 The prior used here is proportional to N (.25, .15) over the range [0,1].
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Figure 3 With a uniform prior, a near-maximal degree is required for the positive
member and a near-minimal degree for the negative member. However,
there is more slack than with end-peaked priors.
glasses, as McNally (2011) notes. The difference is simply that speakers and listeners
have different expectations about how full glasses of these types should be, and
these expectations, cashed out as different priors, influence the interpretation in the
expected way. Full as applied to beer glasses might have an interpretation like that
in the left panel of figure 3. As applied to wine glasses, on the other hand, full might
receive an interpretation similar to that of expensive (figure 4, left panel), but shifted
upward: that is, a maximal degree is possible, but a lower degree of fill is much
more likely a priori. The difference in interpretation is driven by the interaction of a
well-motivated difference in statistical priors and the usual pragmatic interpretation
process. We thus explain the possibility of relative and absolute readings of full
without positing ad hoc mechanisms to adjust scale structure, as we would have to
in a faithful implementation of IE.
Note further that our account predicts that this flexibility should be available in
principle for any adjective, if background knowledge provides qualitatively different
priors for different kinds of objects to which the adjective might be applied. This
strikes us as a welcome prediction, considering that theorists have so far been unable
to come to a consensus about which adjectives are absolute and which are relative,
and about which adjectives show a significant region of uncertainty (compare, e.g.,
Rotstein & Winter (2004) to Kennedy & McNally (2005); Kennedy (2007)). Our
model leads us to expect that English speakers with different experience, or who are
imagining applying the adjective in different circumstances, may come to different
conclusions about the interpretation of an adjective.
On our account the relative/absolute distinction is not a binary distinction, but a
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Figure 4 Even with bounded scales the model predicts relative interpretations if
most of the prior mass is shifted away from the endpoints. This suggests
an account of “expensive” and “cheap”, which have small but non-zero
prior mass at the minimum.
matter of degree: interpretations may adhere more or less strongly to an endpoint,
depending on the form of the prior. Nor is it a property of adjectives per se: rather, it
is a property of interpretations which emerges from the interaction of an adjective’s
lexically determined scale structure and interpreters’ background knowledge about
the scalar property which the adjective describes.
Note finally that this account predicts that the distribution of degree modifiers
(e.g., completely closed/?tall) is not as directly related to the presence or absence of
scalar endpoints as Kennedy & McNally (2005); Kennedy (2007) suggest. We are
able to state weaker constraints, such as:
• If Adj is on a scale with no upper bound, completely Adj cannot have a
maximizing reading for semantic reasons.
• If Adj is on a scale with an upper bound, the degree-maximizing reading
of completely Adj is less felicitous to the extent that Adj is interpreted as a
prototypical relative adjective.
We must leave a full investigation of these important issues to future work.
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5 The sorites
Our account builds conceptually on previous probabilistic theories of vagueness
(Edgington 1997; Frazee & Beaver 2010; Lassiter 2011a; Égré 2011), but is more
ambitious: while these accounts merely assume that the meaning of an adjective
in context is given by some probability distribution, our account makes precise
predictions about what this distribution should be, and explains why it should depend
on statistical properties of a reference class.8 In this section we describe an account
of the sorites for relative adjectives similar to Edgington’s, and suggest that this
account may be able to predict the difference in sorites susceptibility between relative
and absolute adjectives noted by Kennedy (2007).
We set up a sorites sequence as follows: the first member xn is an individual
who is clearly Adj, and the last, x0, is an individual who is clearly not Adj. Each
non-initial member of the sequence has a degree of Adj-ness exactly ε less than
the previous member. The general form of the sorites paradox is as in (17); (18)
illustrates with the stock relative adjective tall, and ε = 1 mm.
(17) a. xn is Adj.
b. If xm is Adj, then xm−1 is Adj.
c. ∴ x0 is Adj.
(18) a. André the Giant is tall.
b. If someone is tall, then a person
1 mm. shorter is also tall.
c. ∴ Danny DeVito is tall.
If we take the second (“inductive”) premise to involve implicit universal quantifica-
tion over all m, the argument is valid but its conclusion is absurd. The problem is
to explain how the first premise can be true and the conclusion false, while doing
justice to the intuition that the inductive premise is intuitively compelling in (18b).
We suggest interpreting the tall-sorites in (18) as:
(19) a. P(André the Giant is tall) is high.
b. P(“xm−1 is tall” is true∣u = “xm is tall”) is high.
c. ∴ P(Danny DeVito is tall) is high.
The crucial choice we are making here is to model the inductive premise as a
conditional probability statement, where the condition is the assumption that the
individual xm would be described as “tall” by a cooperative speaker who knows
the listener’s prior. The condition that xm−1 is tall, given that u = “xm is tall”, is
equivalent to the condition that that θtall does not fall within ε of xm’s height; for, if
it did, xm would be tall and xm−1 would not. In other words, the intuitive strength
8 See Sutton 2013 for a different effort to predict, rather than stipulating, probabilistic interpretations
for vague expressions. While our model overlays probabilistic reasoning onto truth-conditional
semantics, Sutton argues that vagueness motivates a rejection of this program for semantics.
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of the conditional statement (18b) is equal to the probability that the height of a
randomly chosen individual who has been described as “tall” is at least ε greater
than θtall .
(20)
P(“xm−1 is tall” is true∣u = “xm is tall”)= P(µtall(xm−1) > θtall ∣u = “xm is tall”)= P([µtall(xm)−θtall] ≥ ε ∣u = “xm is tall”)
We can use the samples from PL1(A,θtall ∣u) drawn in our “tall”-simulation to
approximate this probability for various values of ε . As long as ε is small, the induc-
tive premise has quite high probability: for example, with ε = .01, P(xm−1 is tall∣u =
“xm is tall”) ≈ .9. We thus predict that the inductive premise of the “tall”-sorites is
intuitively compelling if the step size ε in our sorites sequence is large enough.
However, the argument’s conclusion is not a valid inference. According to the
simulation, if André is very tall (say, .9) and Danny is very short (.1), the first
and second premises of (19) will have high probability, but the third has very low
probability. This is consistent because repeated use of a premise with non-maximal
probability does not preserve high probability of a conclusion (see Kyburg 1961;
Adams 1975, 1998). Semantically, then, the shift to a Bayesian perspective seems to
dissolve the paradox as long as the gloss in (19) is reasonable.9
This model may also help to account for Kennedy’s (2007) observation that the
sorites is less compelling with absolute adjectives.
(21) a. An activity with no danger attached to it is safe.
b. A activity which is slightly more dangerous than a safe activity is also safe.
c. ∴ A hugely dangerous activity is safe.
Unlike (18b), the inductive premise (21b) does not seem to be intuitively compelling.
With ε = .1 and the prior used in the simulation above, the probability that a “safe”
object will fall with ε of the threshold is less than .7. This is much lower than in
the case of “tall”, and so we do not expect that the inductive premise will be as
compelling with “safe” as it is with “tall”.
6 Conclusion
Our model of adjective interpretation is an application of a general pragmatic model
which emphasizes the continuity of language understanding and uncertain reasoning
9 This account is of necessity very brief, and does not address other variants of the paradox. See
Edgington 1997; Lassiter 2011a; Égré 2011 for additional discussion of the probabilistic account of
the sorites with relative adjectives. Note in particular that the case is even clearer with the negative
existential variant of the inductive premise, whose probabilistic rendition asserts that there is no
sudden transition from high to low probability (Lassiter 2011a).
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and decision-making in other areas of cognition. Adopting a simple free-variable
semantics for adjectives, we have applied tools from Bayesian modeling to predict
context-sensitive meanings. The model we proposed derives novel quantitative and
qualitative predictions about adjective interpretation, suggesting a new explanation
of the vagueness and context-sensitivity of relative adjectives, the existence of
borderline cases, and the absolute-relative distinction and its interaction with the
sorites paradox.
Some of the choices that we have made in setting up the model are overly
simplified, such as the assumption that speakers care only about informativity and
cost. The interpretive effects of rich speaker goals remain to be explored, as does
varying the QUD and numerous other possible enrichments and modifications of
the model. Likewise, our account of the relative/absolute distinction relies to a
considerable extent on intuitions about reasonable priors to assume for specific
properties. It will be necessary to refine the choice of priors using experimental
and corpus investigation, and also to validate the assumed posterior distributions
experimentally. Other natural extensions of the model include inferring the QUD
(Kao, Wu, Bergen & Goodman 2014) and choosing the relevant scale for adjectives
for which there are several options (Kennedy 1997; Sassoon 2013).
We hope that this work will be seen as a demonstration of the potential for
fruitful interaction between formal semantics/pragmatics and cognitive science (see
also Goodman & Lassiter 2014). Bayesian modeling makes it possible to combine
logical and probabilistic reasoning seamlessly, opening up new opportunities for
exploring how listeners use context and background knowledge to construct rich
context-sensitive interpretations in the presence of uncertainty.
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